Background: Older, frail patients with multimorbidity are at an especially high risk for disease severity and death from COVID-19. The social restrictions proved challenging for the residents, their relatives, and the care staff. While these restrictions clearly impacted daily life in Norwegian nursing homes, knowledge about how the pandemic influenced nursing practice is sparse. Aim: The aim of the study was to illuminate ethical difficult situations experienced by Norwegian nurses working in nursing homes during the COVID-19 pandemic. Research design and (...) participants: The research design involved semistructured individual interviews conducted with 15 nurses working in 8 nursing homes in 3 health regions in Norway, within both urban and rural areas. Ethical considerations: Oral and written information about the study was provided before the participants gave their written consent. The transcribed interviews were de-identified. The study was approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data. Findings: Four ethical difficult situations were identified: (a) turning the nursing home into a prison; (b) using medication to maintain peace and order; (c) being left alone with the responsibility; and (d) s. impact on decision-making. Conclusions: The nurses’ ethical challenges were intertwined with external factors, such as national and local guidelines, and the nurses’ own internalized factors, which were connected to their subjective professionality. This duality inflicted emotional distress and gave nurses few opportunities to perform nursing in a professionally sound and safe manner. (shrink)

H. S. Eveling; XII—Some Patterns of Justification in Ethics, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 66, Issue 1, 1 June 1966, Pages 149–166, https://do.

As the title indicates, Faith and Knowledge deals with the relation between religious faith and cognitive beliefs, between the truth of religion and the truths of philosophy and science. Hegel is guided by his understanding of the historical situation: the individual alienated from God, nature, and community; and he is influenced by the new philosophy of Schelling, the Spinozistic Philosophy of Identity with its superb vision of the inner unity of God, nature, and rational man. Through a brilliant discussion of (...) the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and other luminaries of the period, Hegel shows that the time has finally come to give philosophy the authentic shape it has always been trying to reach, a shape in which philosophy’s old conflicts with religion on the one hand and with the sciences on the other are suspended once for all. This is the first English translation of this important essay. Professor H. S. Harris offers a historical and analytic commentary to the text and Professor Cerf offers an introduction to the general reader which focuses on the concept of intellectual intuition and on the difference between authentic and inauthentic philosophy. (shrink)

H. S. Eveling; XI.—Composition and Criticism, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 59, Issue 1, 1 June 1959, Pages 213–232, https://doi.org/10.1093/a.

The essay published here in English was one of the earliest documents of the birth of the form of idealism which Giovanni Gentile called “Actual Idealism.” The most celebrated full-length statement of it was published in 1916 as General Theory of the Spirit as Pure Act. But there is no other essay in which the relation between Gentile’s view and the great German tradition from which it derives is made so plain.

The first translation into English and the first detailed interpretation of Hegel’s System der Sittlichkeit and of Philosophie des Geistes, the two earliest surviving versions of Hegel’s social theory. Hegel’s central concept of the spirit evolved in these two works. An 87-page interpretation by Harris precedes the translations.

We all know that there are many different kinds of “thing”; and what we mean, when we say something to that effect, is usually that things behave differently from one another, or react differently in different circumstances. Among the things to which these generalizations apply, we normally count both ourselves and other people. It was natural enough, therefore, for the philosophers to develop a theory of human nature as made up of a variety offacultiesandpowers(or “passions”). For this provides a convenient (...) way of classifying and comparing our behaviours and reactions. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Aristophanes’s speech in Plato’s Symposium is tied into an interesting and hitherto unexplored web of ideas in Plato’s ethics and psychology. The poet’s analysis of erōs as ‘leading us to what “belongs” (the oikeion)’ (193d2) and as ‘restoring us in our “original nature” (archaia phusis)’ (193d4) is not a mere negative contribution that renders him a ‘target for Diotima’s fire’ (Dover). Rather, he unwittingly communicates central ethical and psychological ideas which we find developed in (...) key passages of Plato’s dialogues. What is interesting is that Diotima in a curious passage seems to dismiss his contribution of the oikeion as unrelated to our good (agathon) and irrelevant to the analysis of desire (205d10–206a1). I argue that this interpretation of Diotima’s response to Aristophanes, which would render her position an ethical anomaly in Plato’s dialogues, should be rejected. Instead, it is more plausible to read her response as proposing a revisionary conception of the oikeion, relying on the idea that our agathon is our true oikeion. In addition, I tentatively suggest that the theory of psychic pregnancy may be seen as presenting the agathon of wisdom of virtue produced in the ascent as an oikeion. Just as fascinating as Diotima’s stance on the oikeion is the question how her teachings relate to the concept of an archaia phusis of the soul. The idea that the soul’s self-perfection constitutes a return to a temporally prior condition of excellence, which in two places other than the Symposium (Republic X, Timaeus) is called the ‘archaia phusis’, is pervasive and centrally important to Plato’s psychology. I address the question whether Diotima’s ascent passage constitutes a psychological anomaly in portraying self-perfection as unrelated to the concept of the archaia phusis. I argue that an answer to this depends on the stance we take on the Symposium’s position regarding the immortality of the soul. While a reading that posits a rejection of immortality in the Symposium must indeed deny a role for the concept in Diotima’s speech, I show that a reading allowing for immortality as a theoretical commitment in the background has an interesting interpretative option: along with Timaeus 90d5, it may fruitfully interpret the ascent as an ordering of the soul ‘in accordance with its archaia phusis’. (shrink)

If critical theory is meant to be the “ruthless criticism of all that exists”, on what basis can critical theory ground its evaluative claims without being self-defeating? Is there a normative ground on which critique can stand? For Jürgen Habermas, critical theory has a ground embedded in the normative logic of communicative interactions. On the contrary, for Michel Foucault, critique can stand on no ground: critique is the refusal of any given ground and the opening up of possibilities for “thinking (...) and acting differently.” In this dissertation, I will show that a reconsideration of the Habermas-Foucault debate can be helpful for elucidating the normative foundations and the tasks of critical theory. Given the incommensurability of Habermas’s and Foucault’s positions, this elucidation aims to forge a non-assimilatory synthesis between them. Juxtaposing Habermas’s emphasis on moral universality and the participant’s perspective with Foucault’s focus on objectivating problematization, I will suggest that, taken in isolation, their critical theories are inadequate, and a ‘synthesis’ of their respective positions can be found in a “critical conception of participatory normativity.” This conception of normativity, which is in some sense outlined in the critical theories of Theodor Adorno and Judith Butler, will offer a way of understanding the normative foundations of critical theory. (shrink)

It is shown that the jet mechanism derivable from the Lorentz deformation picture leads to a nearly constant average jet transverse momentum. It is pointed out that this is consistent with the high-energy experimental data. It is pointed out further that this result strengthens the physical basis for the minimal time-energy uncertainty combined covariantly with Heisenberg's space-momentum uncertainty relation.

The energy-spectrum of two point-like particles interacting in a 3-D isotropic Harmonic Oscillator (H.O.) trap is related to the free scattering phase-shifts $\delta$ of the particles by a formula first published by Busch et al. It is here used to find an expression for the shift of the energy levels, caused by the interaction, rather than the perturbed spectrum itself. In the limit of high energy (large quantum number $n$ of the H.O.) this shift (in H.O. units) is shown (...) to be given by $\Delta =-2\frac{\delta }{\pi }$ , also exact in the limit of infinite scattering length ( $\delta =\pm \frac{\pi }{2}$ ) in which case $\Delta =\mp 1$ . Numerical investigation shows that this expression otherwise differs from the exact result of Busch et al., by less than $\frac{1}{2}\,\%$ except for $n=0$ when it can be as large as $\approx$ 2.5 %. This result for the energy-shift is well known from another exactly solvable model, namely that of two particles interacting in a spherical infinite square-well trap (or box) of radius $R$ in the limit $R\rightarrow \infty$ , and/or in the limit of large energy. It is in solid state physics referred to as Fumi’s theorem. It can be (and has been) used in (infinite) nuclear matter calculations to calculate the two-body effective interaction in situations where in-medium effects can be neglected. It is in this context referred to as the phase-shift approximation a term also used throughout this report. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that the most influential philosophers in America are Charles S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey. James's fame came rather suddenly in the latter half of his life—roughly, from 1880 to 1910; it flourished with the appearance of hisPrinciples of Psychology(1890) and shortly thereafter with his advocacy of pragmatism and radical empiricism. James was acclaimed in England and Europe as well as in America. Peirce, on the other hand, was almost entirely neglected; his work remained unknown (...) to all but a few philosophers and his chief acknowledgment was as a scientist and logician. His importance began to be recognized and his immense researches and writings studied some twenty-five years after his death. It was otherwise with Dewey. During his long lifetime his ideas not only engaged the reflections and critical discussions of philosophers, he also had a profound and contagious influence on education, the social sciences, aesthetics, and political theory and practice. In this respect his thought has reached a wider audience in America than that of either Peirce or James. In his day lawyers, labour leaders, scientists and several heads of state attested to the vitality of his wisdom. (shrink)